WASHINGTON – Last Thursday, U.S. Senator Chris Coons (D-Del.), a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, spoke at the Council on Foreign Relations to assess the nuclear agreement with Iran roughly one year since it was reached. Following his remarks, Sen. Coons was joined by Washington Post columnist and associate editor David Ignatius for a question-and-answer session.

Video and a complete transcript of the Senator’s speech and Q&A is available on the Council on Foreign Relations’ website.

On Friday, Senator Coons published an op-ed on CNN.com entitled, “The lessons of the Iran deal,” which echoes the themes of his remarks.

Senator Coons’ opening remarks as delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations:

Today, as we approach the one-year anniversary of the announcement of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or the JCPOA, I will evaluation whether this deal has succeeded so far, and explain what I’ve done to honor my commitment to aggressively oversee its implementation and its enforcement. Last year, as David just mentioned, after closely scrutinizing the terms of the deal, I concluded that it represented the least-bad option for achieving one of America’s most important foreign policy priorities: preventing Iran from developing or obtaining a nuclear weapon. Since implementation day of this agreement in January, we have seen real and meaningful progress toward that goal.

As I suspect everyone in this room knows, but is important to repeat, Iran has shipped 12 tons of enriched uranium—virtually its entire stockpile—out of the country. The Iranian regime has reduced by two-thirds the number of its functioning uranium enrichment centrifuges. And it has permanently reengineered the Arak Heavy Water Reactor by filling its core with concrete. These three steps in combination cut off Iran’s most likely short-term pathways to a nuclear weapon with either uranium or plutonium.

Iran has also give the International Atomic Energy Agency, or the IAEA, the world’s nuclear watchdog, unprecedented 24/7 access to monitor all of its declared nuclear facilities. That access covers Iran’s entire nuclear supply chain, from Iranian mines and mills to centrifuge production and enrichment facilities—every known nuclear site in Iran. These steps have, for now, frozen Iran’s ability to develop a nuclear weapon. And as a result of Iran’s initial compliance with the agreement, the time for it to break out, to assemble enough fissile material for one nuclear weapon has extended significantly from just two or three months to now more than a year.

So measured by whether the agreement has prevented Iran from developing or obtaining a nuclear weapon, this deal has, so far, been successful. I also, though, have long suspected Iran that would seek to push the boundaries of the deal in ways both minor or major, to test how the United States and our allies would respond. Earlier this week, I had an in-person meeting with Ambassador Steve Mull, the Obama administration’s lead coordinator for Iran nuclear implementation. And I heard what I hoped for, and what I expected, that the Departments of State, Treasury, Energy, and our intelligence community are working closely together to aggressively monitor and enforce the JCPOA.

American officials also are communicating regularly and closely with their Iranian counterparts, with the European Union, and the other key parties to the deal. And as I anticipated, there have been a handful of occasions in the past year in which the United States has had to mobilize our P5+1 partners to hold Iran closely to the parameters of the JCPOA. Here’s a public example. When Iran’s heavy water stockpile in February briefly reached 130.9 metric tons, exceeding the JCPOA limit of 130 metric tons, the IAEA quickly observed this anomaly, reported it to the partner countries, we took action, and Iran addressed it. There are several other incidents I can’t describe in public, but in each case the United States rallied our international partners to promptly address a discrepancy or disagreement and successfully enforce this direct interpretation of the deal.

In the years to come—in the many years to come—we have to focus on continuing aggressive enforcement, and congressional oversight will remain critical. But we also have to continue to push back on Iran’s destabilizing and provocative actions outside the four corners, the parameters of the nuclear agreement. From its repeated calls for the destruction of Israel, to its support for terrorism in Syria and Iraq and Yemen, to its ongoing illegal ballistic missile tests, and its human rights violations, Iran is not a responsible state seeking to rejoin the international community. These actions underscore an important point about the deal: The JCPOA was, is, and will mostly likely remain a transactional, not a transformational, agreement.

This deal seeks to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb, not to bring Iran into the community of nations. Only a genuine change in direction by the Iranian regime can do that. Rather, though, than walking away from the deal, in my view the United States must remain engaged, and to lead the international community’s enforcement of the agreement. As I tell my Senate colleagues regularly, whether you opposed or supported the JCPOA last year, we have a shared interest in working together this year and in the future to make sure this deal succeeds.

With that said, let me briefly review broadly where we are today, nearly a year into the deal. Two things really haven’t changed at all. First, Iran remains untrustworthy. Since its 1979 revolution, Iran has pursued interests and advocated values that are completely opposed to those of the West. And its approach to regional crises has not changed. Second, Iran continues to exploit weak states and power vacuums. And we need to disrupt Iran’s destabilizing activities in the Middle East and to support our regional partners, most importantly by promptly concluding a strengthened 10-year memorandum of understanding on defense priorities with Israel. 

But two additional points I think are worth emphasizing. Broadly, the last year has shown that international agreement and multilateral diplomacy can be effective, even with rogue states like Iran. There is value in talking with our enemies. Second, we’re today engaged in a public disagreement with Iran about whether it is, in fact, seeing the benefits of the deal. When Valiollah Seif, the governor of Iran’s Central Bank, spoke here at the Council on Foreign Relations earlier this year in April, he argued that the United States and our European allies had not honored our JCPOA obligations, because Iran hasn’t been able to access the global financial system, and hasn’t realized the economic benefits they foresaw from this deal.

But here’s how I see it. The United States has upheld our end of the bargain. We have not prevented Iran from receiving economic benefits associated with the deal. In fact, their recent activity, significant increases in oil exports, billions of dollars in recent deals, and projected economic growth of 3 to 5 percent casts real doubt on Iran’s claims. In my view, Iran alone is responsible for making its market an attractive and safe place in which to do business. And for many corporations and individuals, Iran is neither attractive, nor safe. And I am concerned that by entertaining Iranian complaints of inadequate sanctions relief we risk giving these claims legitimacy. 

If Iran is unhappy with the level of economic benefits its received since the JCPOA, it has only itself and its own actions to blame. Today, as we look beyond year one of the JCPOA and look ahead to five, 10, or 15 years from now, one thing is clear: If this agreement is to succeed long term, engaged congressional oversight remains essential. This oversight falls into two categories, starting with congressional pushback on Iran’s bad behavior outside the deal’s parameters.

That’s why I’ve continued to be outspoken on the floor of the Senate in calling for stronger efforts to interdict Iranian arms shipments to the Houthi rebels in Yemen, and in celebrating those interdictions that have occurred. I’ve also asked foreign leaders, including those from Israel, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, India, and Russian, about how to strengthen our efforts together to counter Iranian aggression. And I’ve urged Congress to provide this administration with unilateral authority to address Iran’s ongoing ballistic missile tests, given the inertia in the U.N. Security Council. I’ve called on the administration as well to levy additional sanctions against IRGC-affiliated entities, like Mahan Aar, which Treasury has done. And I’ve worked to secure increased funding for Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, which enforces these sanctions.

But Congress also has to remain engaged in overseeing the enforcement of the nuclear deal itself. In January, I joined a congressional delegation in visiting IAEA headquarters in Vienna, where we met with Director General Amano. The JCPOA allows hundreds of nuclear inspectors to oversee Iran’s nuclear program through both remote online enrichment monitoring and intrusive in-person inspections. These inspectors, trained in America’s unique national labs, are funded by the United States Congress, and utilize cutting-edge technology, largely developed by our scientists.

Because we are asking the IAEA to engage in an unprecedented level of oversight, Director General Amano has recently publicly raised concerns that his agency is stretched thin as it works to implement this deal. That’s why Congress must do our part to ensure the IAEA has reliable, long-term resources. This IAEA responsibility has taken on an even greater importance this week, given recent news that that agency has detected signs of North Korean plutonium reprocessing. The IAEA responsibilities remain global and important, and need to be effectively sustained. 

I’ve also repeatedly called on Congress to take full advantage of the IAEA’s unprecedented access to Iran’s nuclear program, by increasing our voluntary contribution to the agency, which would encourage our international partners to do so as well. In addition, I’ve pressed for the confirmation of Laura Holgate as U.S. ambassador to the U.N. offices in Vienna, which includes the IAEA. And I’ve called for the renewal of the Iran Sanctions Act, so that we have a viable mechanism to snap back sanctions in Iran violations the JCPOA. I intend to uphold my commitment to oversee strict enforcement of this deal, regardless of who is elected president this fall.

As our moderator this afternoon recently wrote in a column: The Iran nuclear agreement deserves far more attention in this presidential campaign. And I couldn’t agree more. If we abandon the JCPOA, we don’t end up with a better agreement, nor do we end up with no agreement. Instead, our partners around the world will most likely develop a new strategy to deal with Iran without American leadership or input. If we abandon this agreement, we signal that we’re giving up on diplomacy. We could lose valuable intelligence. We would forego the support of our allies. And we would close vital communications channels to senior Iranian leaders that have helped to restrain Iran’s nuclear program. Frankly, I think that’s exactly what the most conservative elements in Iran’s regime want. 

But let me be clear about that. We can, and we should, distinguish between the Iranian regime and the Iranian people. The people of Iran continue to turn out at the polls to vote, even in elections that are not truly free nor fair. They have repeatedly demonstrated in the streets for democracy and engagement, risking their lives to do so. The Iranian people deserve our support in their struggle for human rights and democracy, especially during this sacred month of Ramadan, as Muslims around the world reflect on their hopes for peace. But the Iranian regime deserves condemnation for a decades-long pattern of human rights abuses, support for terrorism, and other bad behavior.

The government of Iran, the Iranian regime, remains a dangerous revolutionary government, and it will continue to present a potential nuclear threat for decades to come. Preventing Iran from obtaining a nuclear weapon will require steady leadership, an understanding of the complexities of international diplomacy, and constant scrutiny of Iran’s behavior. These tasks must be the responsibility not just of this president this year, but a top priority for the next president, the intelligence community, and members of Congress for many years to come. That’s why I intend to stay actively engaged in monitoring enforcement of the deal, in advocating for a strong foreign policy that supports our allies in the Middle East and promotes American interests and values around the world. Thank you.