WASHINGTON – U.S. Senator Chris Coons (D-Del.) denounced President Trump’s wavering commitment to Taiwan in spite of strong bipartisan congressional support at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Taiwan today.
“The security, the status of Taiwan – as all three of our witnesses have said this morning – is absolutely essential to our national security, to our economic security, to the 21st century. Whether or not we effectively deter the PRC from taking over Taiwan by force, whether through quarantine or invasion, is probably the most decisive issue of this committee and this Senate will have to address,” Senator Coons said. “It is baffling to me that despite strong bipartisan agreement that this is a critical security issue, that our president is stepping back.”
Tensions in the South China Sea and between Beijing and Taipei have increased in recent years, with Chinese President Xi Jinping threatening a “reunification” with Taiwan in the coming years. In the face of these threats, Congress has acted to support Taiwan, passing the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act in 2023 and providing robust military funding for Taiwan.
Earlier this year, Senator Coons and East Asia Subcommittee Chair Pete Ricketts (R-Neb.) traveled to Taiwan and the Indo-Pacific, where they saw firsthand Chinese threats to Taiwan and the entire region. They later led a tabletop exercise gaming out a potential Chinese energy embargo of Taiwan and potential American responses. This year, Congress has also passed Senator Coons’ Taiwan Assurance Implementation Act to strengthen the State Department’s Taiwan policy guidance.
While Congress increases its support for Taiwan, however, the Trump administration is stepping back. As Senator Coons mentioned in his remarks this morning, foreign military sales (FMS) to Taiwan have all but dried up this year. After averaging $4.5 billion per year in FMS during President Trump’s first term, there have been only $300 million in FMS to Taiwan this year. Additionally, the Trump administration has canceled high-level defense dialogues with Taiwan and denied the Taiwanese president transit through the United States.
In addition to being a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Coons is Ranking Member of the Committee’s East Asia Subcommittee and Ranking Member of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense.
A video and transcript of Senator Coons’ questioning is available below.
Senator Coons: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, thank you to our witnesses.
This is a critically important hearing. The security, the status of Taiwan – as all three of our witnesses have said this morning – is absolutely essential to our national security, to our economic security, to the 21st century. Whether or not we effectively deter the PRC from taking over Taiwan by force, whether through quarantine or invasion, is probably the most decisive issue this committee and this Senate will have to address.
I’m the senior Democrat on defense appropriations. We are investing a huge amount and ensuring we have the naval and aviation and the space resources for a Taiwan contingency, yet we are missing several critical issues that you all just testified to – and I am concerned this administration, rather than focusing and bearing down on the important and critical ways you have just suggested we could provide support for Taiwan, is taking its foot off the gas.
I was grateful for the chance to travel to Taiwan recently with Senator Ricketts and to introduce bipartisan legislation that would help address some of these key challenges around FMS that you’ve mentioned.
The Senate has long played a central role in U.S.-Taiwan policy back to the Taiwan Relations Act 50 years ago, and today, with the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act signed into law by the last president. Our role today is all the more important because we have a partner in Taiwan that is stepping up in critical ways. As Senator Ricketts and I saw on our trip to the region and our visit to Taiwan, they are making dramatic investments that are significantly improving not just their defense budget, but what they’re buying, what they’re doing with it, and how they’re delivering a whole-of-society resilience effort.
It is baffling to me that despite strong bipartisan agreement that this is a critical security issue, that our president is stepping back. If we just look at a timeline of the major security cooperation announcements and congressional notifications concerning Taiwan that occurred from January 2023 to the present – this is FMS sales, FMS obligations, presidential drawdown authorities – [it’s] a very, very long and robust list. And then since President Trump came to office, virtually none.
Ms. Glaser’s testimony noted FMS sales to Taiwan in Trump’s first term was a record $18 billion, but so far in this term, a tiny fraction, ~$300 million. On top of that, the Trump administration has canceled high-level defense dialogs and denied the President of Taiwan transit through the United States, undoing a long-standing precedent of presidents of both parties. All of this to curry favor with China in the midst of a flawed tariff fight.
So, from where I sit, the measure of our policy has to be the impact it has on our adversary – in this case, the PRC.
Ms. Glaser, you’re a recognized China expert, and you keep close tabs on the PRCs perceptions, on Xi’s perceptions, the PLA’s perceptions. How are they seeing all of this? How is this potentially emboldening Xi to make the decision that today’s the day that he will take action, far more aggressive action and risky action, against Taiwan?
Ms. Glaser: Well, thank you, Senator Coons, for your remarks. And we met at the Aspen security forum and in the summer, and I remember you had recently come back from Taiwan, and very much appreciate your attention to the issue.
Taiwan is doing, of course, a great deal to bolster its own ability to defend the island. And I know we are working closely with Taiwan. But the PRC, I think, looks at Taiwan’s capabilities and sees that it can use whatever means that it has to take Taiwan. It will probably try to do so in a way before the United States can get there.
And if they see this administration as diminishing its support for Taiwan, as I said in my testimony, they will probably be more willing to use coercion, to increase measures that it has operated, for example, in the contiguous zone around Taiwan, maybe even fly aircraft in the territorial sea and airspace. And there may be more potential for miscalculation, that they may actually think that the United States will not respond, and they could impose a blockade and then see if there is no response, that then they will wait for Taiwan to surrender when it runs out of energy.
Senator Coons: Thank you.
Dr. Dickey, you mentioned that [the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act (TERA)] provided the authority for the establishment of a regional contingency stockpile in Taiwan, but the executive branch has done nothing. Can you just briefly walk through the pros and cons of this concept: any unique circumstances in the case of Taiwan given the tyranny of distance, why this might be an urgent priority?
Dr. Dickey: Thanks, Senator Coons, and yes, I agree with you that it should remain an urgent priority.
So, there’s two types of stockpiles that I think are really needed. TERA authorizes one that is on Taiwan, but we also need one or multiple elsewhere within the region for the U.S. and allies to use.
You know, when I was in DOD – I departed last March – one of the challenges that we had was this policy question of who owns what and who builds what, right, and ensuring that for whatever stockpile was built that the appropriations matched up with the authority. The challenge we had then was we lacked the military construction or O&M line-item appropriations to build the stockpiles, but we also hadn’t really reached the policy clarity we needed on who would own the keys.
There was a lot of comparison to the Israel model at the time and discussion as to whether, you know, this should look like Israel or shouldn’t look like Israel, the pros and cons of each. And, as I understand it, a lot of those conversations, you know, never really reached their full fruition.
So, my belief is that this stockpile is feasible, but it needs to be done by and with and through Taiwan partners. And once it’s built – as it’s built – it should include not just sort of the hard materiel capabilities that the U.S. or Taiwan would need, but also the non-materiel things – things like medical supplies, food, rations, water, et cetera – things that would really support the people of Taiwan in any crisis scenario.