

# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

April 15, 2025

Ms. Susie Wiles  
Chief of Staff  
The White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Ave. NW  
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Ms. Wiles:

We write seeking additional information on the White House review of the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive information in a Signal group chat related to a U.S. military attack on Houthi targets in Yemen. This group chat contained highly sensitive policy deliberations related to U.S. military action, as well as included precise information on the time and location of anticipated sorties of U.S. aircraft, potentially endangering the lives of servicemembers engaged in combat action.

Recently, the White House Press Secretary updated the press on your internal investigation into the incident by stating that, this “case has been closed here at the White House, as far as we are concerned. There have been steps made to ensure that something like that can, obviously, never happen again.”<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, the next morning, press reports indicated that senior White House officials regularly use personal Gmail accounts to conduct government business, including for “high technical conversations with colleagues at other government agencies involving sensitive military positions and powerful weapons systems related to an ongoing conflict.”<sup>2</sup> Finally, senior administration officials have also told the press that the National Security Council created at least 20 additional Signal group chats for similar policy coordination, many of which contained sensitive information.<sup>3</sup> These additional disclosures indicate a pervasively negligent pattern of behavior, in which basic tenets of operational security and compliance with existing records statutes are openly disregarded.

It is unclear to us if this White House review included the existence of additional Signal group chats, or their contents, or the use of personal email accounts for government business. To that end, we seek to schedule a briefing on the findings and outcomes of the White House’s review of this unauthorized disclosure. We request that the briefing address the following outstanding questions:

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<sup>1</sup> Jeff Zeleny and Kevin Kiptak, *White House closes case on Signal and stands by Waltz, with key questions still unanswered*, CNN, (March 31, 2025), <https://www.cnn.com/2025/03/31/politics/mike-waltz-donald-trump-signal-questions/index.html>.

<sup>2</sup> John Hudson, *Waltz and staff used Gmail for government communications, officials say*, The Washington Post, (April 1, 2025), <https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2025/04/01/waltz-national-security-council-signal-gmail/>.

<sup>3</sup> Dasha Burns, *Waltz’s team set up at least 20 Signal group chats for crises across the world*, Politico, (April 2, 2025), <https://www.politico.com/news/2025/04/02/waltzs-team-set-up-at-least-20-signal-group-chats-for-crises-across-the-world-00266845>.

1. Did the White House review identify other instances in which Signal, or other unapproved personal applications such as Gmail, were used to conduct official business?
2. How many additional Signal group chats were created to conduct official business? What topics were discussed? Have those chats been archived in compliance with the Presidential Records Act? Were subsequent classification reviews of the material conducted?
3. What steps have been taken to ensure that the National Security Council's Archives directorate has accessed all communication on Signal, or other unapproved applications, to preserve the content of these deliberations in compliance with the Presidential Records Act?
4. What, if any, disciplinary actions were taken as a result of the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive military information to a journalist?
5. Was a formal classification review conducted of the messages included in the "Houthi PC small group" Signal group chat? Did the Department of Defense and the United States Central Command concur with the proposed portion-markings contained in any classification review?
6. Did this classification review assess the risk of adversary detection of U.S. aircraft if the adversary were able to obtain the precise take-off location of inbound aircraft?
7. Is Signal an approved messaging application for the transmission of Controlled Unclassified Information (CUI)?
8. What specific steps have been taken "to ensure that something like that can, obviously, never happen again"?

We look forward to your prompt reply within two weeks, and a briefing to the Subcommittee not later than April 30, 2025.

Sincerely,



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Christopher A. Coons



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Patty Murray



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Richard J. Durbin



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Jack Reed



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Brian Schatz